We show that the proofs of Gill as well as of Gill, Weihs , Zeilinger and Zukowski contain serious mathematical and physical deficiencies which render them invalid.
The purpose of this note is to point out several mathematical errors in the papers by Gill [1] and by Gill, Weihs, Zeilinger and Zukowski (GWZZ) [2] on their mathematical model for EPR experiments. In the class of EPR experiments considered here, correlated pairs (e.g. a pair of electrons in the singlet state) are emitted from a source S to two spatially separated analyzer stations S 1 and S 2 . Each particle of a given pair carries the same information package Λ. It is assumed that Λ is a random variable, defined on some probability space Ω, whose elements are denoted by ω. One can think of the ω's as being simple, indecomposable experiments in the sense of Feller. For instance ω can be thought as being the experiment of sending out a correlated pair from S, as we will assume in the present note, or as being the experiment of sending out λ (a value that the random variable Λ assumes) which can be treated in the same way. The measuring instruments in the analyzer stations S 1 and S 2 are represented by two unit vectors each, a and d in S 1 and b and c in S 2 . The measurements are denoted by A a (Λ(ω)), A d (Λ(ω)) in S 1 and by B b (Λ(ω)) and B c (Λ(ω)) in S 2 . The A's and the B's are considered to be random variables, defined on Ω, and to be assuming the values +1 and -1, only.
GWZZ [2] introduce the entity (their Eq. (5), see also Gill [3] )
where 1{...} denotes the indicator of the event in curly brackets. 
They showed by a simple arithmetic manipulation involving the factoring of A a and A d respectively that Γ = 2 or −2. Now obviously we have e.g.
plus three similar relations. Substituting these into Eq.
(1) we obtain
and therefore ∆ = 0 or −2. Thus the GWZZ approach is a trivial modification of the CHSH approach.
The claim by GWZZ that ∆ = 0 or −2 as well as the claim by CHSH that Γ = 2 or −2 are based on the assumption that each A with the same setting is the same (either +1 or −1) independent of what the setting for B is. At first glance, this assumption appears to follow from the definition of locality. However, locality can only demand that A, as a function, be independent of the setting chosen for the given pair in station S 2 . A does not have to be the same in the events {ω : A = B}, respectively in the products A.B, when we have the same setting in S 1 and different settings in S 2 . We demonstrate this error in two steps, the first involving basic physics and probability theory, the second involving more detailed physics and the hypothesis of certain time dependencies of EPR experiments.
On grounds of basic physics and elementary probability theory, it is impossible to have at any given measurement time-period for any given correlated pair two (or more) different macroscopic configurations or settings of instruments that are chosen and observed by the experimenter. It is also physically impossible to generate two or more guaranteed identical correlated pairs and to send them simultaneously to several different stations with different settings. Therefore, no experiment ω can be performed that can simultaneously determine the values of all four indicators in Eq.(1). Each experiment ω can determine only the value of one indicator, the other three are counterfactual. Four separate experiments are needed to determine the values of all four indicators, as can also be seen from the experimental arrangement of GWZZ [2] . Hence ∆ corresponds to a non-performable experiment and ∆ is a non-computable entity. Thus the definition of ∆ in Eq(1) is meaningless because ∆ is not a well-defined function on Ω. The mistake that GWZZ make arises from their Fig.2 that cannot be reconciled with the physical facts of their actual EPR experiment and the corresponding appropriate construction of a sample space [4] .
For the reasons just given, the ω's in each of the four different events of Eq(1) must be all different and hence there is no guarantee that the corresponding values of Λ are the same. Thus there is no guarantee that the values of the various A's and B's are the same although they are tagged by the the same vectors a, d and b, c respectively. As a consequence the arithmetic manipulation mentioned above cannot be carried out. Hence, at this point of GWZZ's proof [2] , the assertion that ∆ assumes only the values 0 and -2 is false.
Because ∆ is not a function on Ω, ∆ is not a random variable. Thus it makes no sense to take conditional expectations of copies of ∆ with respect to past sigma fields. Thus and because the assertion that ∆ = 0 or −2 is false it makes even less sense to speak in this context about supermartingales and to apply exponential probability bounds for supermartingales, as was done by Gill [1] , nor does it make sense to apply the strong law of large numbers to the sequence of independent copies of ∆ because ∆ is not a random variable.
There is an ironic twist to the logic in [1] and [2] . If the authors are that convinced that ∆ of Eq(1) assumes only the values 0 and -2, what is the purpose of considering a large number of these non-performable experiments based on ∆? What is the purpose of then averaging the results of these non-performable experiments and then to show that these averages contradict the results of actual experiments when in fact EACH of these non-performable experiments is already predicted by Eq(1) to yield the outcome 0 or -2? All that is needed is a one on one comparison of the results of a few of these non-performable experiments with the results of actual experiments.
Having seen that GWZZ [2] and Gill [1] violate the syntax of probability theory as outlined e.g. in Feller's [4] work, we proceed to ask the question whether the proof of GWZZ can be saved by certain assumptions on the parameter space? Indeed, if Λ assumes only one value e.g. λ 1 , then Eq(1) is obviously validated. More generally, the procedure of GWZZ can be validated if and only if any set of data (outcomes) can be reordered in rows corresponding to Eq(1) give or take a few left over terms that are insignificant for large numbers of experiments. The proof of this statement is trivial. We have shown, however, in past publications [5] that such reordering is limited to parameters Λ having a probability distribution with countable support and certain restricted time dependencies. As can easily be seen, the Bell type proofs will not go forward if, for instance, the λ's are replaced by the necessarily all different clock-times of measurement. We have also shown that the physically very reasonable extension of the parameter space to include setting and time dependent instrument parameters puts Bell type proofs and reordering arguments to a halt [5] , [6] . Instrument parameters are not subject to any further locality conditions and restrictions because they describe the instruments and therefore are permitted to depend on the setting of the given instrument. It is also physically reasonable to let these setting dependent instrument parameters depend on a clock-time of the measurement. This time is, as mentioned above, guaranteed to be different for different settings. The introduction of such physically reasonable time dependencies invalidates, a fortiori, the assumptions that lead to the outcome 0 or -2 for ∆.
As a final remark, we would like to point out that the concept of "time" used by Gill is incommensurate with the time-concept that has evolved after Zeno and the early Greeks. Gill [1] counts as history and time only the past randomly chosen settings and the past measurements of A and B. Time thus emerges as representing a finite number of events that have very specific properties. This primitive notion of time is at the basis of Gill's conditioning on past sigma fields and his false claim that the structure he considers is a supermartingale. Paradoxical consequences of such oversimplified views are not surprising. It is known since Zeno that the strangest paradoxes arise from linking time to a countable number of specific events. Gill's oversimplified model and time-concept can not be used to explain the motion of Foucault's pendulum or a compass based on gyroscopes; nor should it be used to explain correlated spin pairs for that matter. In summary, GWZZ's [2] and Gill's [1] proofs are physically overly simplified and mathematically artificial, negligent, incorrect and circular; particularly when considering the highest standards that must be applied when the foundations of scientific frameworks are investigated.
